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Labor Law-Application of Pre-emption Doctrine in Suits to
Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements
P brought suit in a Michigan trial court asserting the breach
of a no discrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
The complaint alleged that during a strike conducted by another
union, non-union employees were permitted to report for work and
were paid full wages, while most members of P's union were denied
this privilege although they were available for service. The trial
court granted D's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and
the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed on the theory of pre-emption.
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 360, 106 N.W.2d 785
(1961). On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, held, reversed. The pre-emption doctrine does not negative
a cause of action grounded in federal substantive law, even though
the action complained of is admittedly an unfair labor practice.
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
In 1935 the National Labor Relations Board was charged with
the responsibility of determining the rights of the parties in labor
disputes arising in industries engaged in interstate commerce. The
federal judiciary devised the pre-emption doctrine as a shield to
protect the exclusiveness of this congressional grant of jurisdiction.
Pre-emption prevents the states either by statute or by administrative
or judicial tribunals from intervening in the area of labor relations
ceded to the labor board. Pre-emption not only applies to state
courts, but is a self-imposed restraint on the federal judiciary itself.
All of this is done in the name of congressional intent.
In 1947 Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act,
which contained a seemingly insignificant provision conferring
jurisdiction on federal courts over disputes emanating from collective bargaining agreements. Labor Management Relations Act
§ 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). Ten
years later the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to grant
to federal courts the authority to mold federal substantive law applicable to collective agreements. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957). The decision in Lincoln Mills spawned the
inevitable clash between the pre-emption doctrine and the power
of the federal judiciary to enforce the rights of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement. Simply stated, when the act complained of is arguably protected or prohibited by § 7 or § 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act, and also constitutes the breach of a

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1963

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 13
1963 ]

CASE COMMENTS

collective bargaining agreement, may a federal court grant relief
under federal substantive law? Assuming that a federal court may
grant such relief, will state courts also be permitted to do so under
the theory of concurrent jurisdiction? The principal case clearly
limits the pre-emption doctrine to actions other than those alleging
the breach of a collective agreement. Further it recognizes that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in
applying the federal substantive law of collective bargaining.
The rationale of pre-emption is well stated in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). In that case sympathetic truckers had boycotted P's loading platform in the face of teamster
pickets, resulting in a ninety-five per cent deterioration in business. A state equity court enjoined the picketing on the ground
that a state labor relations act prohibited a union from compelling
management to coerce its employees to unionize. The state supreme
court reversed the trial court since the act complained of was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed, because singular administration of
labor policy was necessary to obtain a uniform result.
Perhaps the most definitive decision applying the pre-emption
doctrine is Weber v. Anheuser Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1954). There
the Supreme Court held that while union action violated a state
restraint of trade statute, the state court was pre-empted because
the complaint alleged the violation of the NLRA, the truth of
which only the labor board could determine. In the opinion the
Court reviewed the pre-emption decisions to date. First, a state
could not proscribe a federally protected right. Hill v. Florida,
325 U. S. 528 (1944); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1949); and Amalgamated As'n v. Wisconsin Employment
Rels. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1950). Second, a state could not enjoin
the commission of an unfair labor practice. Garner v. Teamsters
Union, supra; Capitol Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (9th
Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 936 (1954). Third, a state could
not certify a union subject to the jurisdiction of the board. LaCrosse Tele. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Rels..Bd., 336 U.S.
18 (71948); Bethleliem Steel..Co. v. Nei6 York StdteL; bor Rels. Bd.,
330 U.S. 767 (1947). State courts were not, however, wholly precluded from the labor field. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Employment Rels. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (violent picketing and
disturbing the peace); International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Rels. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (unannounced work stoppages);
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and Algona Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Rels.
Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (maintenance of membership clauses).
The pre-emption doctrine reached its pinnacle in San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1958), where the
union was charged with the commission of an unfair labor practice.
The issue was whether a state court could grant damages for peaceful picketing. The Supreme Court held that monetary relief was just
as much an interference with the effective administration of the
NLRB as was injunctive relief. Thus, "when it is clear or may
fairly be assumed that the activities which a state purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the NLRA, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield." Further, "in the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither
protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to
essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide
whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction." Thus, it
seemed that the exclusiveness of the labor board's jurisdiction was
effectively enveloped.
In 1962, the Supreme Court made important inroads on the
pre-emption doctrine as it applied to judicial relief under § 301(a),
supra, culminating in the decision in the principal case. In Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), union employees struck in protect of the firing of a fellow member for
wrecking plant equipment. Later the discharge was arbitrably
settled in favor of the company. Meanwhile, the company also had
the strike enjoined and recovered damages in tort in a state court.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even in the absence of
a no strike clause the parties were under a duty to arbitrate before resorting to self-help. The pre-emption doctrine was relegated
to a footnote, wherein it was held inapplicable. The apparent
reason is that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to apply
federal substantive law. While the trial court proceeded on a state
tort theory, and the state supreme court applied state contract
law, the Supreme Court affirmed because in applying federal substantive law, the same result would have been reached. This is
so even though a federal court would be precluded from issuing
an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
That state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts to apply the federal substantive law of collective bargaining
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was most clearly pointed out in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962). The union sued the employer for breach of
a stipulation included in a tentative draft of a new collective bargaining agreement. The union asked the state court for an injunction,
accounting, and damages. Management contended that § 301(a)
granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts and that the state court
was, therefore, pre-empted. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that concurrent jurisdiction has been a "common phenomenon" throughout the history of American jurisprudence
and that exclusive jurisdiction to enforce federally created rights
was the exception and not the rule. Accord: McCarroll v. Los
Angeles Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957).
Prior to the Dowd Box decision, state courts had expressed some
reluctance to grant relief for the breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. In Elisco v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 387 Pa. 274, 127 A.2d
32 (1956), union members charged that company removal of a
plant to another location was both an unfair labor practice and
a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The court applied
the pre-emption doctrine. However, in a suit to enjoin the arbitration of eighteen claims, the Massachusetts court stated in response
to the allegation that five employees had been fired for union
activities that NLRB jurisdiction, while exclusive, could not be
said to preclude voluntary arbitration by the parties. Post Publishing Co. v. Cort, 334 Mass. 199, 134 N.E.2d 431 (1956). This is
substantially in accord with the view of the federal court that a
party need not give up his contractual rights for a cumbersome
administrative remedy. Lodge No. 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works,
257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
One perplexing issue which could prove vexing to a state court
is how will the court decide a given case in the absence of federal precedent? In McCarroll v. Los Angeles Dist. Council of Carpenters, supra, the California court was squarely faced with this
issue. The court said: "What the substantive law of collective
bargaining agreements is we cannot know. Until it is elaborated
by the federal courts we assume it does not differ significantly
from our own law." Federal courts are often faced with the same
issue in applying state law in diversity of citizenship cases. See,
Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 214 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.
1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
The principal case seemingly clarified one further matter
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of importance as to the authority of the judiciary to grant relief
in actions arising under § 301(a). Initially, § 301(a) was conceived
to be merely procedural in nature for the benefit only of the signatory parties to a bargaining agreement; therefore, it seemed that
personal rights of the individual union members were unenforceable
either by the members or the union. Assn of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1954). The
principal case extends the right to enforce federal substantive law
to individual members of a union, thus, laying to rest the implications of the Westinghouse case.
In summary, recent Supreme Court decisions clearly indicate
that the pre-emption doctrine will not preclude a state court from
applying federal substantive law and thereby granting relief for
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement even though the
action complained is admittedly an unfair labor practice. The
NLRB seems to be in accord with this view as the Solicitor General by way of amicus curiae contended that to oust the courts of
jurisdiction would obstruct the purpose of national labor policy.
James K. Edmundson, Jr.
Mines and Minerals-Breach of CovenantMeasure of Damages
P, lessor under an oil and gas lease, brought this action for
an alleged breach of an express covenant to market contained in
the lease. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of P and
found the measure of damages to be the interest on the royalties
P would have received had D acted diligently. From this decision
both P and D appealed. Held, affirmed in part; reversed in part.
The judgment in favor of P was sustained but the court determined
that the proper measure of damages should be the amount of the
royalties P would have received and not merely the interest thereon. The court further decided that D would be entitled to a dollar
for dollar offset for the damages so paid when the gas was subsequently marketed. Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962).
The principal case illustrates the difficulty that has confronted
the courts in dealing with the enforcement of an oil and gas lease.
The problem stems from the unusual nature of this type of leasing
arrangement. An oil and gas lease is in effect a hybrid instrument.
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